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I. INTRODUCTION
Election ballots and international custody battles aside, all eyes are on
Florida for yet another reason: Florida's steady push to privatize the opera-
tion of its social services programs. Part of Governor Jeb Bush's plan to
trim the government payroll by transferring state functions to private com-
munity groups, including faith-based organizations, privatization in Florida
has hit industries ranging from nursing homes for veterans to the child
welfare system.'
Privatization is also known as "managed care" and resembles managed
care in the health care setting.2 Both terms refer to the use of a variety of
approaches intended to balance the cost of services with quality and cus-
tomer access by reconciling the provision of care to each individual with the
resources available to serve an entire pool of customers. "Cost effective-
ness is achieved by efficiently delivering the most appropriate services to
J.D., University of Virginia School of Law (1977); M.A. in Public Policy and
Administration, University of Wisconsin (1971). Director of the Children First Project at
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
1. See Steve Bousquet, Veterans Blast Bush Plan to Privatize, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Jan. 29, 2001, at IA; Steve Bousquet, Faith-Based Initiative Familiar to Florida,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 30, 2001, at 1A.
2. Florida calls this movement "community-based care." See FLA. DEP'T OF CHILD-
REN & FAMILmS, COMMUNrTY-BASED CARE END OF YEAR REPORT 2, available at http:/Iwww.
dcf. state.fl.us/cf_web/mspt (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter REPORT].
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each individual served.",3 The following strategies are typically used by
managed care systems to balance cost, quality, and access: pre-authorized
care; gatekeeping and utilization review; use of standardized practice guide-
lines; management of data through information technology; built-in financial
risks and incentives; and outcome-based contracting.
While Florida is unique in the breadth and scope of its privatization
movement, many other states are experimenting with the transfer of pieces of
state government functions to private organizations, particularly in the area
of child welfare services.5 By 1999, twenty-nine states had one or more
initiatives to change their management, financing, or child welfare service
6delivery practices by adopting one or more principles of managed care.
There are two basic elements to managed care arrangements in child welfare:
fixed or capitated prospective payments to at least one service provider,
rather than traditional fee-for-service reimbursement payments; a single
7private entity responsible for providing appropriate and quality services.
The majority of the twenty-nine states that operate child welfare "man-
aged care" initiatives are experimenting with the delivery of services to
emotionally disturbed children, only one segment of the child welfare popu-
lation. In some states, certain counties, most notably Jefferson and Mesa
Counties in Colorado, serve all children in foster care in privatized systems.8
Kansas was the first state to develop a statewide system of managed care for
all of its child welfare services. 9 Now Florida has joined Kansas in this
endeavor.
3. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., MANAGED CARE INsTrruTE 1, available at
http://www.cwla.orglprograis/managedcare (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
4. Id.
5. Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Child Welfare: New Financing and Service Strategies Hold
Promise, but Effects Unknown, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources,
Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (July 20, 2000), in U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFFICE (GAO), GAO/T-HEHS-00-158 (2000) [hereinafter GAO Statement]. For purposes of
this article, "child welfare" or "child welfare system" will refer to the full range of functions
and services operated to protect Florida's abused, neglected or dependent children, including
protective investigations, early intervention services, family preservation and support services,
shelter care, foster care, therapeutic foster care, group care, residential care, independent
living, postadjudication case management, postplacement superversion, permanent foster care,
and adoption.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. See generally Patricia Callahan & Kirk Mitchell, Foster Care Too Often Fails to
Keep Kids Safe, available at http:llwww.denverpost.comnews/fosterO521a.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2001).
9. GAO Statement, supra note 5, app., at 16.
620 [Vol. 25:619
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This article will first describe the statutory characteristics of the child
welfare community-based care movement in Florida, as well as the shift in
statutory philosophy regarding the roles and responsibilities of Florida's
state child welfare agency, the Department of Children and Families. Next,
the national and state contextual drivers serving as the impetus for Florida's
child welfare community-based care and the attributes of successful com-
munity-based care will be described. This will serve as background for a
discussion of the following three challenges facing Florida's implementation
process: adequate state funding; limitation of legal liability; and preserva-
tion of appropriate state parens patriae roles.
The article will conclude with recommendations designed to assure that
Florida's process is effective in protecting children, rather than abdicating
state responsibility and devolving state obligations upon local communities
and private providers without adequate resources.
I. CHILD WELFARE CoMMUNrTY-BASED CARE IN FLORIDA
The Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF'), Florida's
child welfare agency, began privatizing child welfare services in several
Florida communities in the early 1990s by purchasing an extensive array of
services from private sector providers such as the Florida Sheriffs Youth
Association and the Children's Home Society. "Of Florida's $373 million
child protection budget [in 1999], $240 million or [sixty-three] percent [was]
spent on services provided by the private sector."' ° Some seventy licensed
child-placing agencies offered foster, group, and shelter placements, and
some 104 offered only adoption services.
But in 1996, the sea change in the delivery of child welfare services in
Florida began in earnest. The Florida Legislature authorized DCF to con-
tract with competent community-based agencies for the provision of foster
care and related services,12 and to establish five model community-based
pilot programs, one of which had to be operated by a for-profit corporation.
1 3
10. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, COMMITrEE ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES, SENATE STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIc IMPACT STATEMENT, CS/SB 660, at 1 (1999).
11. Susan Vivian Mangold, Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster Care
System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295, 1313 n.81 (1999).
12. These services are to include: "family preservation, independent living, emer-
gency shelter, residential group care, foster care, therapeutic foster care, intensive residential
treatment .... postadjudication case management, postplacement supervision, permanent
foster care, family reunification, the filing of a petition for the termination of parental rights,
and adoption." FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1) (Supp. 1996).
13. § 409.1671(1), (5). The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
amended the Social Security Act shortly after the 1996 session of the Florida Legislature
adjourned to allow federal reimbursement of costs by Title IV-E for foster care provided by
2001]
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The expressed intent of the Florida Legislature in creating this community-
based care model was to strengthen the support and commitment of commu-
nities for the reunification of families and to promote efficiency and in-
creased accountability in the care of children and families.'
4
In 1998 the Florida Legislature expanded the concept of community-
based care and directed DCF to privatize all foster care and related services
statewide, phased in over a three-year period beginning on January 1, 2000. "
The legislature required DCF to prepare a plan to transfer all available funds,
including federal funds, to such community-based agencies. 16
The concept of an "eligible lead community-based provider," a single
agency that contracts with DCF for the provision of child protective services
in a community no smaller than a county, was established with the following
parameters:
[t]he ability to coordinate, integrate, and manage all child
protective services in the... community in cooperation
with child protective investigations; [t]he ability to ensure
continuity of care from entry to exit for all children re-
ferred [by] ... protective investigation and court[s]... ;
[t]he ability to provide directly, or contract for through a
local network of providers, all necessary... services;
[t]he willingness to accept accountability for meeting the
outcomes and performance standards... established by
the Legislature and the Federal Government; [t]he capabil-
ity and the willingness to serve all children referred to it
from the protective investigation and court systems, re-
gardless of the level of funding allocated to the commu-
nity by the state, provided all related funding is trans-
ferred; [t]he willingness to ensure that each individual
who provides child protective services completes the train-
ing required ....
DCF, the contracting agency, retained responsibility for the quality of
contracted services and programs, for ensuring services were delivered in
accordance with applicable federal and state statutes and regulations, and for
private for-profit companies. See 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (Supp. III 1997). Some argue that "[tihe
entrance of profit making into the system raises issues of accountability and oversight unique
to the profit making structure of the corporations." Mangold, supra note 11, at 1295.
14. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
15. Id.
16. Id. The services to be privatized include the list of services authorized in 1996
minus the filing of petitions for the termination of parental rights. Id.
17. § 409.1671(1)(b).
[Vol. 25:619
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establishing a quality assurance program and an annual evaluation of com-
munity-based agencies. IS
Emboldened by its 1996 and 1998 legislative successes, DCF sought
and obtained permission from the legislature in 1999 to suspend its statutory
duties and responsibilities and to submit a comprehensive reorganization
plan to achieve more effective and efficient service delivery and improve
accountability.' 9 The Department's comprehensive plan articulated an eye-
catching vision for community-based care that created local community
alliances to draw together lead agencies, networks of service providers, and
the department in implementing the reorganization.20 The effort would begin
with community-based care for child welfare services, but would incremen-
tally expand to include all other services.21
According to DCF, such a bold step was necessitated by the following
factors: a statutory mission too enormous to fulfill, with a span of control
too broad and communications between central offices and districts often
problematic; "[1lack of true partnership with local communities; [a]bsence of
local systems of care ... characterized by a single point of intake for as-
sessment, service planning, and care management with necessary specialized
services carefully coordinated and integrated to meet the needs of...
client[s]; [lack of uniformity in] contract management [of] over 1700 indi-
vidual contracts;... [lack of resource coordination between the state and
localities]. 22
DCF's proposed solution would be to create a responsive system of care
in local communities which would produce an integrated service plan for
each family and which would be accessible, individualized, family-centered,
respectful, integrated, effective, efficient, normalized, and community
focused.23 Community-based care would be composed of the community, a
Community Alliance serving as the focal point of community ownership and
oversight of the system of care, a lead agency providing core services, and a
network of local service providers.24
While DCF would "continue to be responsible for the overall provision
of state and federally mandated and funded services,"5 the most controver-
sial portion of the plan would require local communities to share both the
18. § 409.1671(2), (3)(a).
19. Ch. 99-219, § 1(1), 1999 Fla. Laws 1351 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19).
20. FLA. DE"T OF CHI)R.DN & FAMnmS, CoMPREHENsvE PLAN TO REORGANTE Thm
DEPARTmENT OF CHILDREN & FAMuI 8, available at http://www.state.fl.us/cf-web/reorg
(Jan. 1, 2000) [hereinafter COMPSREHENsE PLAN].
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 5-6.
23. Id. at 9-10.
24. Id. at 11-12.
25. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 20, at 19.
2001]
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costs and the risks of operating the system and delivering services. 26 Local
communities would be expected to commit increased funds and might be
expected to develop local match funds in order to obtain an increment of
state funding.27 Risk would be shared through a case rate funding approach
with a state set-aside of a risk pool.
28
The Florida Legislature balked at the notion of requiring local govern-
ments to share greater costs, and specifically provided in year 2000 that "the
Legislature does not intend by its privatization of foster care and related
services that any county, municipality, or special district be required to assist
in funding programs that have previously been funded by the state., 29 The
legislature was silent, however, with regard to expectations of private pro-
viders, although it authorized the creation of a risk pool to reduce the finan-
cial risk to eligible lead agencies resulting from unanticipated caseload
growth30 and agreed to establish community alliances to oversee the devolu-
tion to local communities.31 The legislature further put some skids on DCF's
adventurous plan, limiting application of the larger plan to one prototype
region and requiring demonstrated improvement in management and over-
sight of services or cost savings from more efficient administration before
32the Secretary of DCF could expand the plan to other districts.
Perhaps the greatest change in Floridalaw regarding the administration
of its child welfare system is the reduced mission of the state child welfare
agency and its Secretary. In 1995, the mission of the then Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, was "to deliver, or provide for the deliv-
ery of, all health, social, and rehabilitative services offered by the state
through the department to its citizens," 33 and the duties of the department
were statutorily prescribed. Most notably, they included providing assis-
tance to individuals, preventing and remedying neglect, abuse, exploitation
of children, and aiding in the preservation, rehabilitation, and reuniting of
families.34
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(l)(a) (2000).
30. § 409.1671(7). The legislature appropriated $4.5 million for the risk pool in
2000. REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
31. § 20.19(6). The initial membership of each community alliance is a representative
of county government, school district, county United Way, sheriffs office, circuit court, and
children's board. Id. § 20.19(6)(d)(1)-(7).
32. § 20.19(7). The prototype region is the geographical area including counties in
the 6th, 12th, and 13th judicial circuits. Id. § 20.19(5)(a)(7), (16), (17).
33. FLA. STAT. § 20.19(1)(a) (1995).
34. Id. Other responsibilites included but were not limited to: cooperating with other
state and local agencies in integrating the delivery of all health, social, and rehabilitative
[Vol. 25:619
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In 1996, this mission was changed, along with the name of the depart-
ment. DCF was "to work in partnership with local communities to help
people be self-sufficient and live in stable families and communities.,, 35 The
1996 statute, however, retained the prescribed duties of DCF.36 By 2000,
these defined purposes had disappeared. The mission of DCF now is "to
work in partnership with local communitiese' to help people be self-sufficient
and live in stable families and communities.37 The duties of the Secretary
are, simply, to assure "that the mission of the department is fulfilled in
accordance with state and federal laws, rules, and regulations." 38 Gone are
the obligations to provide assistance to individuals and to prevent or remedy
neglect, abuse, and exploitation and to aid in the preservation, rehabilitation
and reunification of families.
The community-based care revolution in Florida is now complete. No
longer is the focus of ownership, responsibility, and service delivery. The
state child welfare agency, according to state law, at best, holds shared
responsibility for the protection of children with local communities and
enjoys a vast diminution of duties.
II. IMPETUS FOR CHILD WELFARE COMMUNMTY-BASED CARE
The motivation for community-based care comes from different
sources. One driving force, certainly one prevalent in Florida, is the desire
to shrink the size of state government and eliminate the need for civil service
protections that make it difficult or impossible to discipline or fire incom-
petent employees. Community-based agencies can terminate ineffective
employees at the will of the supervisor.
39
A stronger motivating force, however, is the desire to fix what most
commentators describe as a broken child welfare system: one beset with
escalating costs and a poorly integrated patchwork of services.40 Nationally,
state child welfare systems are currently responsible for more than one
services offered by the state to those in need of assistance; providing such assistance as is
authorized so that clients might achieve or maintain economic self-support and self-suffi-
ciency; preventing or reducing inappropriate institutional care, as well as functions related to
health and mental health. Id.
35. FLA. STAT. § 20.19()(a) (Supp. 1996).
36. Id. The prescribed purposes are almost identical to the purposes contained in the
1995 statute. See FLA. STAT. § 20.19(1)(a) (1995).
37. FLA. STAT. § 20.19(1)(a) (2000).
38. § 20.19(1), (2).
39. See Bousquet, Veterans Blast Bush Plan to Privatize, supra note 1, at 6A.
40. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE (GAO), GAO/HEHS-99-8, CHILD WELFARE: EARLY Ex-
PERIENCES IMPLEMENTING A MANAGED CARE APPROACH 2 (Oct. 1998).
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7
Zawisza: Child Welfare Managed Care in Florida: Will It Be Innovation or A
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
million children needing protection or care.4 1 "Foster care is intended to
provide a temporary, safe haven for children whose parents are unable to
care for them," according to Michael Mushlin.42 Yet more than half a mil-
lion children currently languish in government foster care at a cost of $12
billion.4 3 In the current child welfare delivery system, there are many prob-
lems. Among these problems is the lack of permanence; "children remain in
foster care too long without being reunited with their parents or adopted into
a permanent home."" Compromised safety is another issue; "children are
sent back to abusive homes or placed with abusive foster parents or in
overcrowded conditions." 45 There are a high number of placements; "chil-
dren move from foster home to foster home within short time periods, jeop-
ardizing their safety and stability." Heavy caseloads is yet another prob-
lem; "social workers are responsible for far too many children to supervise
all cases thoroughly." 47 Finally, caseworker turnover is among the problems;
"foster children face many changes and have to adjust to many casework-
ers."
48
In the latter half of the 1990s, the march toward foster care drift for
abused and neglected children seemed almost inexorable. While
[i]n 1996, approximately 520,000 children were in foster care; by
March 1999, 547,000 children were in foster care. In 1996, 11
percent had been in foster care for three to four years, and 10 per-
cent had been there for five years or longer. By March 1999, 15
percent had been in foster care three to four years and 18 percent
had been in foster care 5 years or longer. In 1996, 54,000 children
were legally available for adoption; by March 1999, 117,000 were
legally available for adoption.
The average length of stay of a child in foster care in Florida in November,
2000 was 35.6 months.
5 0
41. Id. at 5.
42. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C. R.-C.L. L. REv. 199, 204 (1988).
43. Lisa Snell, Reason Public Policy Study #271, Child Welfare and the Role of
Privatization 6, available at http://www.rppi.org/ps271html (Oct. 2000).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Snell, supra note 43.
49. Id.
50. REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
[Vol. 25:619
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Jill Chaifetz observes the incalculable human loss behind these statis-
tics, the enormous personal pain and hurt, and the tangible, detrimental
societal costs. "Children who have grown up or left foster care fill the
nation's jails, mental hospitals and welfare rolls," according to documented
studies. 5
These results have occurred despite the passage of good laws. The
federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) was
designed to address the decades old problem of foster care drift: the phe-
nomenon of a child literally growing up in foster care. 2 The AACWA
provided fiscal incentives to states to "prevent the removal of children from
their homes unless necessary and to reunify them with parents or relatives as
soon as possible. Adoption or other permanent living arrangements were to
be found if prevention or reunification was lacking.53 The AACWA required
states to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal or to reunify through
services; ' 4 to develop written case plans to direct the provision of services
for each child;55 to judicially or administratively review the status of each
child at least every six months;56 and to hold a permanency hearing within
eighteen months of placement. 
5
The promise of the AACWA was never fulfilled. The federal law's
financing scheme incentivized keeping children in foster care. Lack of state
funds for services, insufficient foster homes, and lax federal monitoring of
state programs contributed to the problem.58
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) sought to cure
some of the defects of the AACWA. It makes federal reimbursement con-
tingent on speeding up the process of cases heading towards termination of
parental rights, by removing the mandate for reasonable efforts to reunify
children under certain circumstances,5 9 requiring permanency hearings
within twelve months instead of eighteen,60 and providing fiscal incentives to
states to foster more adoptions. As another impetus, President Clinton
issued a challenge to states to double the number of children moved from
51. Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The
Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 8 (1999).
52. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637, 639 (1999).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1) (1994).
54. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. IV 1999).
55. § 671(a)(16).
56. § 675(6).
57. § 675(5)(c).
58. Chaifetz, supra note 51, at 9.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (Supp. IV 1999).
60. § 675(5)(c).
61. § 673(b) (West Supp. 2000).
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62foster care to adoption by 2002. The ASFA changes have placed enormous
pressure upon child welfare agencies to improve service delivery.
63
Another force behind community-based care has been the influence of
class action lawsuits and high profile media stories about the "failure" of the
system to protect and serve children. 64 Class action lawsuits against public
child welfare agencies on behalf of children have driven more than twenty
states to operate under court consent decrees.
65
Florida is currently plagued with three such class action lawsuits. M.E.
66v. Bush, filed in 1990, challenges the failure of the state to provide mental
health services to children in state custody. 67 Ward v. Kearney, filed in
1998, challenges unconstitutional conditions in the child welfare system in
69 70Broward County, while Foster Children v. Bush, filed in 2000, challenges
such failures on a statewide basis. 71 Another systemic child welfare lawsuit,
Children v. Chiles,72 was settled in 1995. 73 In addition, a celebrated circuit
court damage action, Two Forgotten Children v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,74 resulted in a jury award of some $4.4 million.
Hardly a day goes by without media attention to the inability of Flor-
76ida's child welfare system to protect children. The most famous case of
62. William Eggers & Adrian Moore, Privatization: A Growing Trend in Child
Welfare, HEARTLAND INST.: INTELL. AMMUNrrION (June/July 1997), available at http:llwww.
heartland.orglialjunjul97/privatization.htm.
63. See Gordon, supra note 52, at 639; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1312.
64. CHIMD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 3.
65. Id.
66. No. 90-1008-Civ-Moore (S.D. Fla. 1990).
67. Id. at 2.
68. No. 98-7137-Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla.) (settlement approved May 31, 2000).
69. Id. at 2.
70. No. 00-2116-Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla. 2000).
71. Id. at 3.
72. No. 90-2416-Civ-Kehoe (S.D. Fla.) (Apr. 19, 1995).
73. Memorandum Opinion in Support of the Court's Order Approving the Parties
Settlement and Granting Intervention, Children v. Chiles, No. 90-2416-Civ-Kehoe (S.D. Fla.
1995).
74. Final Judgment at 2, Two Forgotten Children v. Dep't of Health & Rehab Serv.,
No. 95-19835 CA2 & No. 96-5980 CA27 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 1999).
75. Id.
76. Just three months into 2000 produced the following reports in only two newspa-
pers in Florida: Shana Gruskin, Child Abuse Suspect Should Not Have Been Allowed Near
Troubled Boy, SUN-SENTINEL, web-posted July 19, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shana
Gruskin, Child-Welfare Workers Criticized for Defying Judge's Order on Troubled Child,
SUN-SENTINEL, web-posted Aug. 22, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shana Gruskin,
Parents of Tough Teens Say Government Help Often is Offered Too Late, SUN-SENTINEL,
web-posted July 17, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shana Gruskin, Teen Argues State
10
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late has been that of Kayla McKean, whose death in 1998, after repeated
reports of abuse to the state child abuse hotline, failed to prompt her removal
from her parents' home, resulted in the Kayla McKean Child Protection Act
of 1999.7' Against this backdrop of documented failures, federal pressure,
lawsuits, and media attention, a methodology that saves costs and improves
outcomes, tested in the public health care delivery system, looks very attrac-
tive to Florida policy makers.
7 8
I. ATmRIBUTES OF SUCCESSFUL COMMUNTY-BASED CARE
Community-based care is not a new phenomenon in child welfare. For
much of this country's history prior to the middle of the twentieth century,
private agencies "championed interventions on behalf of abused and ne-
glected children," while governments made "fledgling efforts." 79
The federal government "became financially involved through [passage
of] the Social Security Act of 1935" and the creation of the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program.80 Only with the passage of the AACWA,
ASFA,8 and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 did the
federal government assume a major role in the funding of child welfare
Care Failed Him, StrN-SENTwEt, web-posted Aug. 4, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com;
Margarita Martin-Hidalgo & Ellis Berger, 13-Year-Old's Search for Life Ended in Death in
Miami, SUN-SENTIEL, Aug. 20, 2000, at IA; Carol Marbin Miller, Agency Probes Claim
Girl, 5, Was Abused, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 9, 2000, at IB; Carol Marbin Miller,
'Red Flags' Didn't Save 11-Year-Old From Abuse: Broward Case Indicated Risk, at IA,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 20, 2000; Carol Marbin Miller, Shelter Has Reported 40 Kids
Missing, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 13, 2000, at IA; Carol Marbin Miller, Shelter
Running Without License: Suicide Try Leads to Check of Facility in Oakland Park, MIAMI
HERAL (Broward), June 30, 2000, at IA; Carol Marbin Miller, State is Sued Again, Ripped
for Failures in Foster Care, MIAMI HERAL (Broward), June 15, 2000, at 3B; Carol Marbin
Miller, Teens Try to Help Troubled State Agency, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June 16, 2000, at
3B; Shannon O'Boye, Suicidal Teen Left Hanging Because Workers Mistakenly Thought He
Was Dead, SUN-SENTRNE, web-posted July 14, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shari
Rudavsky, Lawsuit: Child Welfare System Abusive, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June 7, 2000,
at 2B.
77. Kayla McKean Child Protection Act, ch. 99-168, 1999 Fla. Laws (amending FLA.
STAT. § 39 et seq. (2000)). See Snell, supra note 43, Introduction.
78. See generally CHIrn WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 3, at 2; see Bousquet,
Faith-Based Initiative Familiar to Florida, supra note 1, at 6A.
79. Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public
Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 1397, 1429 (1999); Gordon, supra note 52, at 642; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1301-11.
80. Gordon, supra note 52, at 642; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1306-07.
81. Gordon, supra note 52, at 642.
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services through incentive payments to states. 82 Even with increased federal
funding, however, states still retain a great deal of discretion in the operation
of their child welfare systems.
8 3
The lessons of the past have led to increased motivation for systemic
reform. Thanks to research, it is now possible to identify attributes of suc-
cessful community-based care. One of these attributes includes design and
pricing; good systems ensure access to the full range of services needed and
adequate funding to support service delivery and ensure quality.4 Another
attribute is quality; good systems have quality as the centerpiece and use best
practices and procedural protocols that are followed. Role clarity is yet
another attribute; "public and private sector responsibilities must be clearly
defined and delineated. ' '86 Outcomes are another factor to consider; good
systems have "meaningful, measurable, and attainable outcome measures
and performance benchmarks. ' '87 Management information systems should
also be considered; such systems "must be capable of monitoring and evalu-
ating critical information on an ongoing basis."88  Finally, an inclusive
planning process is important- all stakeholders must be included in the
design and evaluation process.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its study of child welfare
managed care initiatives around the country, reports that states and localities
are meeting some of these attributes better than they did under public deliv-
ery, to the encouragement of state and local officials.90 Child welfare sys-
tems are becoming more results oriented and performance based through
outcome measures for child safety, child permanency, child and family well-
being, stability, and client satisfaction for which providers are accountable. 9'
Initial evaluation of Florida's community-based care pilot projects
established by the 1996 Legislature also demonstrated mixed results. Some
improvements over the DCF run system were noted. These included: weekly
in-person contact with the child in 65% of the cases, reduction of number of
children per foster home to 1.6, average caseload of 18.9, average number of
placements per child in the community-based system was 2.79, length of stay
82. Id.; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1308-10, 1312.
83. Gordon, supra note 52, at 643.
84. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 3, Overview.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. CHmD WELFARE LEAGUE OFAM., supra note 3, at 2.
90. GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 1-2.
91. Id.
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in foster care shortened 66%, counselor turnover three or more times in only
12.8% of cases, and foster parent satisfaction in 78.9% of cases.92
On the other hand, for the three pilot projects for which data is avail-
able, two of the three were not successful in meeting the following perform-
ance goals: children not re-abused during service provision, children not re-
abused one year after service closure, average length of stay for children
whose goal was family reunification, and reentry into foster care within one
year after reunification.93 Even the most successful project, the Sarasota
County Coalition, failed to meet its performance Fgoal regarding prevention
of re-abuse during one year after service closure.9 Evaluations of the Kan-
sas privatization effort also showed mixed results on key performance
measures.95 Performance regarding lack of re-abuse improved in care and
stabilization of placements, while performance on timely achievement of
permanency and remaining home after reunification worsened.96
The GAO, therefore, sounds a cautionary note. In some states, overall
costs have increased. 97 Kansas, for example, experienced cost overruns of
45.2 million dollars.98 Many state and local agencies do not have appropri-
ate data systems in place.99 In Florida, for example, the legislature's Office
of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA)
found that monitoring focused on contract compliance instead of on the
quality of services provided. 10 The GAO calls for increased rigorous
evaluation of these managed care initiatives so that we have a true picture of
their outcomes.101
92. Snell, supra note 43, at 10.
93. See generally OPPAGA Draft, infra note 94.
94. The Florida Legislature, Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability (OPPAGA), Justification Review, Child Protection Program, Florida Depart-
ment of Children & Families, Report No. 01-Draft, 45-46 (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter OPPAGA
Draft]; See generally OPPAGA, Justification Review, Child Protection Program, Florida
Department of Children and Families, Report No. 01-14 (Mar. 2001). The Sarasota Coalition
has since become a lead agency. OPPAGA Draft, supra, at 48. Among the factors in the
success of this agency are the agency's already established infrastructure and experience, a
"well developed and active community stakeholder group," executive leadership, the county's
wealth of local resources, and a small child population. Id.
95. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 55-56.
96. Id. at 56.
97. GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 12.
98. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 55.
99. GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 2.
100. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 58.
101. See GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 2.
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IV. LIMITATIONS OF COMMUNITY-BASED CARE IN FLORIDA
Florida faces considerable challenges in implementing community-
based care in a way that will produce consistently positive outcomes for
children and families. OPPAGA reports that DCF is experiencing difficult-
ties in establishing lead agencies and will not meet its statutory deadline of
January 2003 for statewide child welfare privatization. 10 Among the barri-
ers cited by OPPAGA are lack of capacity and experience of community-
based providers to assume additional management responsibilities; reluc-
tance to assume financial risk; and sentiment that child protection should
remain a state function.
10 3
This section will discuss three hot spots: 1) adequate funding; 2) limita-
tion of legal liability; and 3) preservation of appropriate state parens patriae
roles.
A. Adequate Funding
As discussed previously, Florida's community-based care vision re-
quires shared costs and risks with local communities. But community-
based care often costs more than traditional child welfare service delivery.'
r 5
One of the attributes of successful programs is adequate funding to support
service delivery and ensure quality.
While Governor Bush has committed record levels of funding for child
welfare programs and the total funding for child welfare in the Executive
Budget for Fiscal Year 2001-2002 is $761 million, an eighty-seven percent
increase since Governor Bush took office, 10 7 this budget must be viewed
against a backdrop of years of under funding and a currently soaring child
welfare population in Florida. By June 2001, the number of children in out-
of-home care in Florida is expected to rise to over 18,000 children.'0 8 Cur-
102. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 41.
103. Id.
104. See COMPREHENSWE PLAN, supra note 20, at 23.
105. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 55; GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 11; Carol
Marbin Miller, Private Services "Better" for Kids, But State Strategy Could Get Costly, Early
Figures Show, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 1, 2001, at IA. DCF expects Community
Alliances to share ownership and responsibility for resource development. REPORT, supra
note 2, at 25.
106. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
107. Florida's e-Budget, Health and Human Services, at http://www.ebudget.state.fl.us/
priorities/ebudgethealthandhumanservices. asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2001).
108. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMIMS., FAMILY SAFETY, LEGISLATIVE BUDGET RE-
QUEST 2000-2001.
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rently there are approximately 12,164 children in out-of-home care; 09 in mid
1997, there were 9045.10 The DCF admits that this huge growth has re-
sulted in insufficient foster homes to meet the demand, resulting in over-
crowded conditions with children and staff staying in motels, children placed
at serious risk of harm, unrealistic expectations for care and supervision by
foster parents, rapid turnover, and failure in meeting statutory expectations
for permanency within twelve months."
1
OPPAGA lists financial risk as one of the obstacles to successful imple-
mentation of community-based care in Florida,1 2 a finding that is not sur-
prising. Providers worry that the state will not give them the resources to do
the job right and that community-based care is just another under funded
state mandate.!
13
One measure of anxiety centers around the availability of a "Risk Pool"
to protect lead agencies from the risks of uncompensated growth due to
unexpected caseload increases, legislative and policy changes, and media
awareness. Under a state-run child welfare system, the DCF had the ability
to transfer funds from other programs or districts to address costs associated
with these risks, a remedy no longer available under community based care.
The Florida Legislature set aside $4.5 million in budget authority for a "Risk
Pool" in the fiscal year 2000-2001,114 a minuscule amount compared to
DCF's projected 2002 child welfare budget of $761 million and the pro-
jected growth of numbers of children in out-of-home care.1 5 No administra-
tive rules have been promulgated to allow providers to access even these
limited "Risk Pool" funds.
Adding to the apprehension is the language of the Statement of Assur-
ances contained in the proposed DCF contracts with lead agencies. Appli-
cants must agree to "ensure continuity of care from entry to exit for all
109. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FAMILY SAFETY, SUBSTITUTE CARE REPORT
(July 2000-Sept. 2000).
110. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILES, FAMILY SAFETY AND PRESERVATION,
MANAGEENT PLAN SUMMARY (July 1997).
111. See generally REPORT, supra note 2.
112. See OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 41. This consternation might be expressed
by existing agencies not showing interest in serving as a lead agency; lack of capacity to serve
as lead agency; or demands for more resources. REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18.
113. Shana Gruskin, Two Agencies Team Up To Bolster Foster Care in Palm Beach
County, SUN-SENTDNE, web-posted Dec. 11, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com. One fiscal
advantage of community-based care is that private agencies can earn Medicaid dollars at a
higher rate than can the state. The Sarasota Coalition, for example, earns $1 million in
Medicaid billings to supplement its $14 million in DCF funding. Miller, supra note 105, at
2A.
114. REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
115. See generally OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94.
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children referred" and "serve all children referred, regardless of the level of
funding allocated by the State of Florida."'116 The Statement of Assurances
omits the clear language of statutory law containing the clarifier, "provided
all related funding is transferred." Community-based agencies under-
standably see this contract clause as an administrative abdication." 8
Illustrative of the depth of community misgivings about the ultimate
success of community-based care, is the analysis of a prospective lead
agency in Miami-Dade County, which claims that DCF's new direction has
thrown the foster care system into crisis. It says:
The cost of recruiting, training services, and supporting foster
homes, while creating an infrastructure to provide services properly
without adequate financial support, has threatened the viability of
the privatization movement in Miami-Dade County. In turn, this
has placed a great strain and created apprehension among the cor-
porations, foundations, and community partners that have already
joined the effort. 11
9
This agency's Supported Foster Care Program costs $28 a day per child.12
Although the initial reimbursement rate provided by the state for two years
was $20 a day, DCF now provides $15.66 ?er day, leaving the agency to
make up $12.32 a day through private funds. This is in contrast to the $36
that Florida spends on receiving, screening, and referring just one call to the
Child Abuse Hotline.1
22
Cost issues have already spawned litigation in Florida. The Lake
County Boys Ranch, a privatized lead agency, has sued DCF for injunctive
relief and damages after DCF notified the Ranch that the state agency would
116. CHiLDREN'S HOMESOC'Y, APPENDIXXII, STATEMENTOFASSURANCES, 86-87.
117. See FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(b)(5) (1998).
118. Interview with Kathryn O'Day, Vice-President for Program Development and
Evaluation, Children's Home Society (Feb. 14, 2001).
119. CHARLEE HOMES FOR CHILDREN, FOsTER CARE CRISIs 1.
120. Jacqueline Charles, Funding Puts Pressure on Foster-Care Agencies, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 2, 2001 at lB.
121. Id. The Children's Home Society receives $15.00 per day. Charles, supra note
120, at 1B, citing DCF's need to divert the money to create new programs and increase the
number of children in others. In contrast, Florida provides $23.83 for care of an adult in an
assisted living facility, a rate also deemed woefully inadequate. Carol Marbin Miller, Crisis of
Care for Florida's Mentally Ill, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 11, 2001, IA.
122. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 9.
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take over all child welfare functions by December 31, 1999.123 The suit
alleges, inter alia, failure of the state to protect children, failure to allocate
sufficient funds, failure to follow the statute, contract breaches, negligence,
fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and defamation.1
4
The agency had originally contracted to care for all new children entering
state care each month, a number that averaged twelve children per month.
After the death of Kayla McKean,'25 the number of new cases each month
exceeded 100, with sometimes as many as 170. When the Ranch first signed
its contract, there were 200 children in care in Lake County; when the
lawsuit was filed, there were 1500. The Ranch was providing care for fifty
percent of DCF's children, while receivinz only thirty percent of funds
allocated.1 6 The lawsuit is now on appeal.
2F
Resource issues need to be squarely resolved by DCF. Without resolu-
tion, communities will either decline to step up to the plate, will be unable to
meet quality performance measures, or will embroil the state in mounds of
litigation.
B. Limitation of Legal Liability
Closely linked to the above discussion is the question of legal liability.
While the state retains legal responsibility for children in its care, and sover-
eign immunity is waived for negligence in the performance of operational
level activities of DCF caseworkers, 28 a statutory cap limits the state's
123. Petition, Lake County Boys Ranch v. Kearney, No. 00-3055, (Fla. 5th Jud. Cir.,
Lake County, FL) (Sept. 20, 1999), appeal pending, No. 99-2413 CA, (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App.).
124. Id.
125. See Snell, supra note 43, at 4.
126. Lake County Boys Ranch, No. 00-3055, at 12.
127. Id. In addition, officials of the Ranch were indicted in April 2000 for Medicaid
fraud and grand theft for over-billing, double billing, and fraud in their billing practices.
OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 48.
128. See Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988)
(calling actions of caseworkers investigating and responding to reports of child abuse opera-
tional level activities and legally actionable); Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Whaley,
574 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1991) (calling the care of youth in detention an operational level activity
and legally actionable). But see Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 627 So. 2d 512
(Fla. 1993) (holding that decisions about where to place a child and the kind of services to
give them are planning level activities and not actionable); Lee v. Dep't of Health & Rehab.
Servs., 698 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1997) (holding that decisions about staffing and staffing levels
are planning activities and not actionable).
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financial risk.1 29 Private providers, on the other hand, do not have sovereign
immunity and can be held legally responsible for negligence in the delivery
of their services.'
30
In the 1999 Florida Legislature, private providers attempted to secure
passage of a law to make any community agency that delivers foster care and
related services under contract with DCF an instrumentality of the state and,
thus, subject to the same statutory damage cap as the Department.' 3 ' They
feared that one or two major jury verdicts for children would drive them out
of business. But some legislators were leery of opening the door to nonchild
welfare corporations doing business with the state and worried that such a
provision might reduce accountability among private providers and encour-
age the same indifferent services that led to child welfare tragedies. 32
The 1999 Legislature required lead agencies and subcontracters to
acquire a liability insurance policy of at least $1 million dollars per claim
and $3 million per incident. The outcome was that the legislature also
limited economic damages (past and future medical expenses, wage loss, and
loss of earning capacity) to $1 million and noneconomic damages (pain and
suffering) to $200,000 per claim.133 Community-based care providers secur-
ed some degree of lessened liability, but certainly liability remains of great
concern in the decision to enter into contracts with the state.134
C. Preservation of Appropriate State Parens Patriae Role
Another attribute of successful community-based care is role clarity.
Not only does Florida law and practice fail to clearly delineate the role of the
state versus the role of communities in its "partnership," the very nature of
the "partnership" described in Florida law 13may run afoul of state parens
patriae and police powers to protect children. Implicit in the state's desire
to "share costs and risks" is the desire to diminish the state's liability. This,
however, may not be legally possible.
129. The cap is $100,000 per incident of negligence and $200,000 total per victim.
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1999). A successful litigant would have to seek a special claims bill
from the legislature to exceed the statutory cap. Id.
130. The United States Supreme Court, in Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399
(1997), held that private persons performing governmental functions are not entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. at 402.
131. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, supra note 10, at 2.
132. See John D. McKinnon, Question of Liability Limit Clouds Future of Privatized
Child Welfare, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1999, at Fl.
133. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(f) (2000).
134. Interview with Kathryn O'Day, supra note 118.
135. See generally CoMPREHENsIvE PLAN, supra note 20, at 5.
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The state may constitutionally delegate "functions" that are traditionally
performed by the government to a private entity, but it may not delegate
governmental "power."' 36 A private entity exercises governmental power
whenever it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property under government
directive,137 giving rise to a claim of "state action." Under the "state action"
theory, the state retains responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of
the children and families over whom community-based care providers
exercise control because the responsibility is nondelegable.
138
The nondelegation doctrine is particularly applicable to the child wel-
fare system for reasons other than the "state action" theory. The state is
prohibited from interfering in family life except to protect children 139 be-
cause of: the state's constitutional police powers; and the state's common
law parens patriae responsibilities.
4
u
Historically the care and protection of children was the prerogative of
the crown, 141 a prerogative which devolved upon the state, as sovereign, for
example, the parens patriae.142 Parens patriae responsibilities are vested
only in the state and are the basis for state laws which protect children.
143
These powers cannot be surrendered, bargained, or contracted away.'"
In the community-based care context, the state can lawfully delegate the
performance of state "functions," such as the delivery of shelter care, foster
care, adoption, and other services to private providers, but it must retain the
136. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J.
647 (1986); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization,
35 UCLA L. REv. 911, 930-31 (1988); Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An
Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFsTRA L. RE'. 649, 668 (1987).
137. Robbins, supra note 136, at 931.
138. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985). See Robbins,
supra note 136, at 931; Field, supra note 120, at 669.
139. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
140. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
141. 3 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTrARms 426-27.
142. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 384 (1854). See Wilhelm v. Spokane Cmty.
Mental Health Ctr., 726 P.2d 479, 483-84 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (Mclnturff, J., concurring)
(discussing the roots of the parens patriae doctrine).
143. See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 485 (Fla. 1977). The Third District Court of
Appeal in Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 960-61 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) recognized that two branches of government, the courts and the executive
branch, can simultaneously exercise protective powers over children but did not reach the
question of sharing power with private entities.
144. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Util. Bd., 40 So. 2d 350, 356 (Fla. 1949); 10 FLA.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 203 (1997).
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"power" and duty to protect children assigned to these services.145 The state
cannot delegate the removal of children from their homes to a non-govem-
mental actor. Nor can the state delegate its ultimate responsibility for chil-
dren once they are in state custody and deprived of their liberty. The logical
implication of this analysis is that the state cannot require private providers
to assume the costs and risks of fulfilling governmental obligations. The
state can ask the community for assistance, but ultimately the state remains
responsible for the adequacy of resources, caseload sizes, and the quality of
services provided.'46
Practically speaking, then, the state is responsible for the costs of
delivery of services in a community-based care environment, costs which are
inevitably greater than in a completely state-run system. 47 The state must
maintain oversight and monitoring responsibilities over the child welfare
system, including the obligation to represent the agency in juvenile depend-
ency proceedings. On top of that fiscal obligation, the state must pay for a
child's daily care and associated services delivered by community providers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Some say that privatization represents an abdication of the state's
responsibility to promote the general welfare of its citizenry.148 On the other
hand, because of its unique ability to foster meaningful, measurable and
attainable outcome measures and performance standards, child welfare
privatization represents one of the best strategies to date to cure the historic
and current ills of the child welfare system.
Will Florida innovate or abdicate? In order to innovate, Florida must be
true to the attributes of successful community-based care. This article has
revealed that Florida is struggling to achieve at least two of those attributes:
appropriate pricing and role clarity.
145. See FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(f)(5) (2000), which does not alter the requirement for
placing legal custody of dependent children with DCF, not with a private agency; OPPAGA
Draft, supra note 94, at 58.
146. Some argue that the non-delegation doctrine has been for all practical purposes
discredited, but it still holds firm in instances where the power delegated was never lawfully
delegable. See A.A. v. State, 605 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Ervin, J.,
concurring) (citing Chiles v. Children A-F, 589 So. 2d 260, 265-66 (Fla. 1991) for an
excellent summary of these points).
147. For example, sheriffs' offices now conducting child protective investigations
spend $654 per investigation, which is $183 more than DCF's average cost per investigation
of $471. Miller, supra note 105, at 2A.
148. See OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94; Chiles v. Children A-F, 589 So. 2d 260, 267
(Fla. 1991) (agreeing that exercising powers that are not capable of delegation is an exercise in
abdication of responsibility); see also Field, supra note 136, at 668-69.
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If Florida will successfully innovate, it must accomplish the following
reforms: clearly establish in law that, while community partnerships are
beneficial, the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of dependent children
lies with the state, i.e. the state is the lead or primary partner in community-
based care; reinstate the prescribed duties of DCF and those its Secretary
recently abolished, i.e. the duty to actually provide services, the duty to
prevent or remedy the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children, and the
duty to aid in the preservation, rehabilitation, and reuniting of families;
clearly establish in law that the ultimate fiscal responsibility for dependent
children lies with the state, by enacting similar language to that which the
legislature used in 2000 absolved local governments of responsibility, for
example, the legislature does not intend by its privatization of foster care and
related services that any private provider of child welfare services be re-
quired to assist in funding programs previously funded by the state;149 fund
an adequate financial "Risk Pool" for community-based care; remove lan-
guage from community-based agency contracts that negate the clear lan-
guage of Florida law that requires the transfer of all appropriate state funds;
appropriate sufficient funds to allow DCF to exercise its oversight and
monitoring obligations while enabling community-based providers to suc-
ceed in daily care responsibilities; reduce the statutorily prescribed legal
liability of private providers to an acceptable level.
The future of Florida's children is in the hands of Florida's elected
officials. Rafts of litigation and media attention are poor substitutes for
informed public policy and skilled public policy implementation. The path
to innovation is clear, but unfortunately the spectrum of government abdica-
tion also lurks ominously on Florida's horizon.
149. FA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(a) (2000).
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